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TAXPAYERS AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976
In response 1.o the United States Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska
Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society,' Congress has enacted legislation authorizing
awards of attorney's fees in areas where such awards traditionally had been
left to the discretion of the judiciary. The Alyeska decision held that the sup-
posed equity power of the courts to award attorney's fees did not exist, and
that courts could award such fees only where Congress expressly authorized
them to do so.' One of the first congressional responses to this decision was
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Awards Act or Act)." A
portion of this statute authorizes the award of attorney's fees in certain cases
arising under the Internal Revenue Code.' The Act provides in pertinent
part:
Wit any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United
States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision
of the United States Internal Revenue Code, ... the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.''
Much debate has arisen with regard to whether this portion of the bill makes
plaintiff as well as defendant taxpayers eligible for awards, and, once eligibil-
ity is established, what standard courts should use in deciding whether an
award is justified."
The tax portion of the Awards Act may have an important impact on the
relationship between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the taxpayer. As
the tax collecting agency for the federal government, the IRS determines if,
when, and how much of a taxpayer's finances the government can collect.
Disagreement as to the timing of payments, amounts assessed, or methods
used by the IRS to evaluate a taxpayer's resources can have a major monetary
impact on the individual or business involved. To ensure fair and impartial
resolution of such disputes, taxpayers must have access to the courts to pro-
tect their interests. Although taxpayers have always had the right to judicial
' 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
2 The plaintiff in Alyeska sought attorney's fees under the "private attorney
general" exception to the "American Rule." Id. at 271. Under the "American Rule,"
each party pays his or her own attorney's fees. Courts developed the exception to the
rule to reimburse individuals who have brought lawsuits that vindicate important
statutory or constitutional rights of all citizens. The Supreme Court decided in Alyeska
that only Congress can create exceptions to the American Rule. Id.
	3  42 U.S.C.	 1988 (1976).
	4  26 U.S.C.	 1 el seq. (1976).
	
42 U.S.C.	 1988 (1976).
' See generally Ellemuck, Holub and Solomon, Attorney's Fees Awards in Tax
Litigation Now Available to Success/u! Litigants, 46 J. TAx. 157 (1977); Comment; Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees in Tax Litigation: 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1368
(1978); Comment, The Civil Rights Altorner's Fees Awards Ad of 1976, Key Buick &
Aparacur: Tin' Availability of Fee Awards to Prevailing Taxpay1. -s and Standards for the !Exer-
cise of Judicial Discretion, 31 TAx LAW. 855 (1978).
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review of IRS action, in reality they cannot always exercise this right because
of the great expense which it entails. The cost of bringing a dispute to court is
often significantly greater than the amount of tax in dispute. Thus, many
taxpayers find it impractical to seek court review of IRS action; as a result.,
wrongful or harassing IRS conduct may remain unchecked, and taxpayers are
sometimes forced to pay taxes they do not legally owe.
The importance of the Awards Act is that it may remove this concern
about attorney's fees from a taxpayer's decision whether to battle the IRS in
court. If the Act can be read to authorize a court to award attorney's fees to
any prevailing taxpayer, it would be a major step towards encouraging tax-
payers to press their claims undeterred by the fear that theirs would be a
pyhrric victory. Unfortunately, the courts almost. unanimously have limited
the statute's application to situations where the taxpayer is the defendant in
court, and can show sonic sort of IRS wrongdoing in bringing the suit against.
him.'
This note will first discuss the judicial response to the Internal Revenue
Portion of the Awards, Act by analyzing Key Buick v. Commissioner' and
Patzkowski v. United States," two examples of the typical judicial interpretation
of the bill. Next, the legislative history of the Act will be considered in order
to compare Congress' objectives with the judicial interpretation of the Statute.
This comparison will focus on two principal areas of contention: whether the
provision allowing attorney's fees in tax cases applies to prevailing plaintiffs as
well as to prevailing defendants, and what standards are appropriate in de-
termining whether a prevailing party should recover attorney's fees. The note
will conclude with a discussion of the practical impact of the Awards Act.
under the limited interpretation which courts are presently giving to it, and
will suggest the need for a broader bill allowing courts to award attorney's
fees to both plaintiffs and defendants, with the same standard liar recovery
applicable to both.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Courts that have considered applying the Awards Act in tax litigation
have been virtually unanimous in their reading of the statute. With one ex-
ception,'" every court has limited the award of attorney's fees to situations
where the taxpayer is the defendant in the suit and can show wrongful con-
duct on the part of the government. in bringing the action." Moreover, in
See text and notes 10-35 in/n.
" 68 T.C. 178 (1977).
" 576 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1978).
" In Levno v. United States. 440 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mont. 1977), the court stated,
with no explanation or reasoning, that "ldhe status of a party as a plaintiff or as a
defendant is not relevant with respect to the award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 in a tax case or proceeding.'' 440 F. Supp. at 11.
" Patzkowski v. United States, 576 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Slodav, 79-1
U.S. Tax Gas. t 9215 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Asher v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Gas.
11 9648 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Better Beverages. Inc. v. United States. 78-2 U.S. Tax Gas.
II 9644 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Bryant v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Pa.
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only two cases have courts found both of these criteria satisfied and awarded
attorney's fees under the Act.' 2 In the rest of the cases, courts have refused
to award fees either because the taxpayer was the plaintiff in the suit or be-
cause the taxpayer could show no wrongdoing on the government's part in
bringing the action.
Key Buick v. Commissioner	 is typical of cases in which a court. has con-
sidered whether the Act applies to prevailing plaintiffs as well as to prevailing
taxpayer-defendants. Key Buick involved a petition for attorney's fees by a tax-
payer who had prevailed in a suit brought by him in the Tax Court to protest
the validity of an IRS deficiency notice. The Tax Court first considered( the
bill's statutory language and concluded that, on its face, the Act applies only
to taxpayer-defendants.' 4 The courts opinion recognized that taxpayers are
always plaintiffs in Tax Court, and since the hill only authorizes fee awards
for suits brought by or on behalf of the United States," taxpayers would
never he eligible for attorney's fees in Tax Court." At the petitioner's re-
quest, the court then reviewed the legislative history of the bill, but came to
the same conclusion. Recognizing that the provision relating to the Internal
Revenue Code was a late amendment to the original bill,'" and hence not
discussed in congressional committee reports, the court reviewed the floor de-
bate concerning the amendment." To support its reading of the statute, the
court cited a number of remarks by congressmen which expressly limit the
hill's application to taxpayers who are defendants in court proceedings.' ,
1978); Engel v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 201 •(W.D. Pa. 1978); Holcomb v. United
States, 78 F.R.D. 527 (E.D. Wis. 1978); In re Wrenn v. United States, 78-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 11 9424 (W.D. Tenn. 1978); Jacobsen v. United States, 78-1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶ 11323
(W.D. Tex. 1978); Richman v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 929 (N.1). Ill. 1978); United
States v. Goldman, 453 F. Stipp. 508 (C.D. Cal, 1978); Chrome Plate, Inc. v. Dist.
Director IRS, 422 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D. Tex. 1977); Ellis Sarasota Bank v. United
States, 40 A.F.T.R. 2d !I 77-6282 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Haskin v. United States, 444 F.
Supp. 299 (C.D. Cal. 1977); In re Kline, 429 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 1977); Lich v.
United States. 438 F. Supp. 1015 (ED. Okla. 1977); Schulken Bros. v. United Slates,
77-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 1) 9712 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Star Oil, Inc. v. United States, 41 A.F.T.R.
2d ¶ 78-388 (W.D. Okla. 1977); United States v. Garrison Constr. Co., 77-2 U.S. Tax
Gas, 11 9705 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Aparacor. Inc. v. United States, 571 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl.
1978); Timken Co. v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 1i 9653 (Ct. Cl. 1978); VGA
Corp. v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 11 9554 (CA. Cl. 1977); Key Buick Co. v.
Comnfr, 68 T.C. l78 (I 977).
12 United States v. Garrison, 77-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9705 (N.D. Ala. 1977); In re
Slodav, 79-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 11 9215 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Sec text and notes 74-86 infra.
13 68 T.C. 178 (1977).
at 179.
15 Id.
'" S. 2278, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1976) and H.R. 15,460, 99th Cong.. 2d Sess.
(1976).
" 68 T.C. 178, 180. 'the full legislative debate on the amendment can he
found at: 122 CoNG. REc. S17049-53 (daily ccl. Sept. 29. 1976); 122 Conic. R, c.
H 12158-67 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976); 123 CoNG. REc. S731-32 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1977).
" The court quoted from statements made by Senators Allen, Tunney, and
Kennedy, all found at 122 CoNG. REC. Si 7049-50 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). See text at
notes 43. 45-46 ip!fra.
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Arguing for a broader interpretation of the Act, the petitioner in Key
Buick pointed instead to a statement by Senator Allen, the sponsor of the
amendment, which suggests that the bill has a wider scope of application."
The Senator maintained that the word "proceeding" in the statute covers ad-
ministrative as well as court actions against the taxpayer." Based on this
remark, the petitioner argued that the bill applies to any taxpayer, plaintiff or
defendant, whose participation in the suit. is triggered by IRS administrative
action, because such suits arise from "proceedings" brought by or on behalf of
the United States. Since the IRS had precipitated this case by issuing a defi-
ciency notice, the petitioner claimed that he was eligible for attorney's fees.
The Key Buick court refused to give any weight to Senator Allen's statements,
however, since they were made over three months after Congress had passed
the bill and, hence, did not influence the legislators' thinking before they
voted. 2 ' The court found, therefore, that Senator Allen's statements were
not indicative of congressional intent, and characterized his remarks as "only
an expression of his opinion." 22 The court then concluded that, in light of
the fire-vote legislative history, "Where is nothing in the use of the word 'pro-
ceeding' ... to indicate that the reference is to any proceeding other than a
court proceeding." 23
In essence, the Key Buick court ruled that the courtroom stage of a
taxpayer-IRS conflict is the critical point in determining- whether an "action or
proceeding" is brought "by or on behalf of the United States." Even though
the IRS through its administrative processes initiates a dispute, a taxpayer is
eligible for attorney's fees only if the IRS also initiates the courtroom battle.
Thus, in Key Buick, the court denied attorney's fees to the petitioner because
he had instituted the suit in Tax Court, even though the IRS initiated the
dispute when it issued a deficiency notice. The court found that both the
statute's language and history indicate that when the taxpayer is the plaintiff
in the litigation., the Awards Act does not apply. 24
68 T.C. at 182.
21' 123 CoNG. REC. 5731 (daily cd. Jan. 14. 1977). For excerpts from Senator
Allen's statement, see text at note 50 in/ia.
'T 68 T.C. at 183.
2 n
23 Id. at 184. The court. briefly referred, in footnote 6 of its opinion, to cases
that have interpreted the word "proceeding" in other statutes to include IRS adminis-
trative activities. It quickly dismissed these cases, however, as involving statutes "so
different from the statute here involved as to be of little assistance." For a more de-
tailed discussion of such cases, see text at notes 48-63 infra.
24 68 T.C. at 184. As a further ground for denying attorney's fees, the court
observed that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 refers to the awarding if attorney's fees "as a part of
the costs." Id. at 179. The court cited Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.G. 515. 533-34
(197(1), nip, 78-2 U.S. Tax Gas. II 9834 (9th Cir. 1978), for the proposition that it had
no authority to award costs. The court in Sharon had decided that 28 U.S.C. § 2412
(authorization for• "any court" to award costs) was inapplicable to the Tax Court, since
Title 28 did riot include the Tax Court in its definition of "court." 28 U.S.C. § 451
(197(1), Thus, the court in Ka Buick, reas[ming that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 conditioned the
authority to award attorney's fees on the authority to award costs, felt constrained not
to award fees. 68 T.C. at 179.
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Other courts, in considering requests for attorney's fees in refund suits,
have adhered to Key Buick's reading of the Awards Act and have denied at-
torney's fees to plaintiff-taxpayers.'" However, an important exception to
this rule has developed. In Patzkowski v. United States," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a taxpayer in a refund suit
is eligible for attorney's fees where the government has filed a counterclaim
against him for additional funds. The court noted that the counterclaim
plainly constituted an action "by or on behalf of the United States"; hence, the
taxpayer was within the ambit of the Awards Act. 27 Although only one court
since Patzkowski has considered and granted a request for attorney's fees
under similar circumstances," it appears that a governmental counterclaim
will suffice to trigger application of the Act.
Once a court finds that a defendant-taxpayer, or a plaintiff-taxpayer
faced with a counterclaim, is potentially eligible for attorney's fees, it must
decide what standard it will use in deciding whether to award the fees. The
court in Patzkowski thoroughly reviewed this question, and all courts that have
subsequently considered application of the Awards Act have relied on its deci-
sion. As a starting point, the Patzkowski court noted that the language of the
Act leaves to the court's discretion the decision whether to award fees." The
court recognized, however, that Congress did not mean to give the courts
carte Nance discretion; rather, Congress "intended that the courts consider
requests by prevailing defendants under [the Awards Act] pursuant to the
standards developed in the already existent case law on awards of attorney's
fees to prevailing defendants."""
Recognizing that a large amount of decisional law on the awarding of
attorney's fees has developed in the civil rights area, the Patzkowski court
turned to those cases for guidance.' It concluded that the standard for
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in suits brought under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 as recently ennunciated by the Supreme
Whether or not this view is correct is beyond the scope of this note. It is
suggested, however, that any future legislation relating to attorney's fees in tax cases
should take into account the Tax Court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and its
effect on 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
See note II supra.
2" 576 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1978).
27 Id. at 136.
"8 Bryant v. United States, 456 F. Stipp. 174 (F.D. Pa. 1978). Although both
Patzkowski and Thyani held the Awards Act applicable to government counterclaims,
neither court had to decide how much, if any, it should award if the taxpayer ulti-
mately prevailed. To the extent that the issues involved in the claim and counterclaim
differ, an appropriate award should include only the costs of litigating those issues
arising from the government's counterclaim. Thus, a possible area of dispute in future
cases is the -allocation of attorney's ices between amounts incurred by the taxpayer in
defending against the counterclaim and amounts incurred in pursuing the claimed
refund.
2! 576 F.2(1 at 137.
30 Id.
2, id.
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
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Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC," is appropriate in awarding fees
to prevailing taxpayer-defendants. Thus, the court held that.:
111]n proceedings where a prevailing taxpayer-defendant requests at-
torney's fees under § 1988, an award may be allowed when there is a
showing that the Government's action was frivolous, harassing, vex-
atious, unreasonable, without foundation, or was instituted in had
faith. A showing of subjective had faith on the Government's part is
not, however, a sine qua non for an allowance of attorney's fees. It is
merely one of several criteria which a district court should consider
in exercising its discretion under the Act.." 4
Since the district court. in Patzkowski considered only whether the government
had acted in bad faith, the circuit court remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion in light of all the criteria (i.e., harassment, vexatiousness, unreasonable-
ness, etc.) mentioned in its opinion." 5
As a result of decisions such as Key Buick and Patzkowski, courts have
applied the Awards Act only when the taxpayer is the defendant. in the suit
and can show that the IRS acted unreasonably, vexatiously, frivolously, or in a
bad faith or harassing manner. As Key Buick and Patzkowski illustrate, courts
that have considered the scope of the Awards Act have relied heavily on legis-
lative history to support their restrictive reading of the Act. A review of that
history is thus necessary to determine if the courts' restrictions are appro-
priate.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act., as
it relates to tax cases, is relatively scant. Both the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees completed their reports"" on the Act before the amendment
granting attorney's fees in tax cases was introduced in Congress." 7 The only
legislative history relating to the IRS portion of the bill consists of the floor
debates over proposed amendments to the original bill.
Senator Allen of Alabama proposed the first tax-related amendment to
the Act." H is proposal clearly applied only to defendant-taxpayers in suits
brought by the IRS to assert. a tax liability. It also expressly restricted the
" 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
" 4 576 F.2d in 139.
0 a
" S. Rio'. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in [19761 U.S. Cons:
CoNc.	 An. NEws 5908; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1976).
" 7 The Senate Report was dated Pine 29. 1976, and the House Report was
dated September 15. 1976. Discussion relating to the amendments concerning [mor-
ncy's lees in tax cases commenced on September 22, 1976.
"" The amendment read as Follows: "Where suit is brought against any person
asserting the existence of lax liability to the government on the part of such person
and said suit is found in such action to be without merit or frivolous," attorney's fees
may he awarded at the court's discretion. 122 Cox`. RF:c. SI6430 (daily ed. Sept. 22.
1976).
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award of attorney's fees to frivolous or meritless suits."" Although the Senate
defeated this proposal, the amendment is similar to the version later proposed
by Senator Allen and ultimately adopted by Congress. Following Senator
Allen's attempt to amend the original act (S. 2278), Senator Goldwater of
Arizona proposed an amendment which would add a new section 6408 to the
Internal Revenue Code. 4 " Senator Goldwater's proposal permitted taxpayers
to recover fees and costs only where they were subjected to second audits
under frivolous or harassing conditions.'" This proposal differed from
Senator Allen's proposal in three major ways. First, it applied to a taxpayer
regardless of whether he was the plaintiff or defendant in court. Second, it
covered the taxpayer's expenses in both administrative and courtroom pro-
ceedings. Third, the award was limited to one type of IRS harassment: second
audits. This amendment, however, was also rejected by the Senate.
One week later, Senator Allen made the proposal that became law that
same day." In making the proposal, he first refamiliarized the Senate with
the issue of fees in tax cases by referring to both the Goldwater amendment
and to his own earlier amendment. He then went on to describe his new
proposal:
3" In Senator Allen's introduction of the amendment, he slated:
We kn ew all too well the proclivity of the IRS to harass taxpayers through-
out the country. it is only right, Mr. President, that if the Government
harasses a taxpayer. brings a frivolous action against him, and it is found
that the taxpayer does not owe the Government any money, that action
may have been befOre the courts for many years and may well have bank-
rupted the taxpayer in attorney's fees for the defense of that action; but if
in the Final determination of the suit it is found that he owes nothing, then
the Government should be required to pay.
Id. at 516428.
It is not surprising that Senator Allen limited the amendment to defendant-
taxpayers. Before introducing his amendment, the Senator, in a lengthy tirade, ques-
tioned the Senate's motivation in awarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs in civil rights
cases. The original bill, relating exclusively to civil rights cases, applied to both plain-
tiffs and defendants. H .R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976). The Senator
stated that he did "not believe it is up 10 the United Slates Government to subsidize
attorneys who bring actions against individuals, against corporate entities, against gov-
ernmental bodies. It certainly is an encouragement to the stirring up of litigation." 122
Cote.. RFC. SI6428 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
4 ° So' 122 CoNc. Ride. S 16445 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
4' The Senator described his new proposal as follows:
[M]y' amendment only applies when the Internal Revenue Service pursues
a second audit.... IMly amendment covers accounting fees as well as legal
costs. „ . [M]y' amendment covers expenses in administrative proceeding as
well as in court.... [M]y amendment covers suits brought by the taxpayer
himself as well as suits brought by the Government.
[T]he need for this amendment stems fro n t the all-too-common
practice of the Internal Revenue Service to reaudit taxpayers who have
already been thoroughly audited once and may even have been told that
there is no change in their taxes.
The amendment would not prevent the Government ft -tun making a
second audit, but it may stop the IRS from harassing people.
Id. at SI6446.
" See text at note 5 supra.
546	 BOSTON COLLEGE L4W REVIEW 	 [Vol. 20:539
What it does is to add to the civil rights attorney's fees provision a
provision that. if the Internal Revenue Service of the United States
Government brings a civil action against a taxpayer to enforce any
provision of the Internal Revenue Code, and the Government does
not prevail against the taxpayer, then the court, in its discretion, sjust
as in the other cases, would be entitled to award the taxpayer
reasonable attorney's fees. That is all it does.... 43
Most congressmen, hearing this description of his new bill and knowing of
Senator Allen's prior statements in proposing his first amendment., would
construe the language applying the bill to "actions or proceedings" initiated
"by or on behalf of the United States" as limiting the bill's application to
defendant-taxpayers. 44
Statements by various congressmen, made both prior to adoption of the
amendment and prior to passage of the entire bill, indicate that this is exactly
how they interpreted the scope of the bill. For example, Senator Tutiney of
California, the initial sponsor of the civil rights portion of the Act, voiced his
support of the Allen amendment and explained his view of the proposal: "Es-
sentially, it would apply to a situation where a taxpayer is harassed by the
IRS. In such a case, a court has discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees
to the defendant."'" Following adoption of the amendment., but prior to pas-
sage of the entire bill, Senator Kennedy stated his view of the amendment:
43 122 CONG. Rrc. SI7049 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). Since Senator Allen was
the initial sponsor of the amendment, his statements warrant careful consideration by
courts in reviewing the legislative history. See, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S.
185, 203 ri.24 (1975); National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640
(1967); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956); Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1951). The influence of a bill's sponsor
on other members of Congress who are trying to understand the bill's scope and de-
cide how to vote is thought to be great. Moreover, members of Congress presumably
were cognizant of Senator Allen's statements regarding his first amendment. At that
time, the Senator blasted his fellow congressmen for "taking care of lawyers on their
fees," and warned of the potential for "stirring up of litigation" by authorizing fee
awards to plaintiffs under S. 2278., 122 CoNG. REC. S 16428-29 (daily ecl. Sept. 22,
1976); see also note 39 supra. The legislators had no reason to assume that the Senator
had changed his position regarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Indeed, in introducing
the second amendment, he mentioned its applicability to ;intuitions where "the Internal
Revenue Service or the United States government brings a civil action against a tax-
payer," and ended by saying "that is all it does. -
44 	 only indication that Senator Allen had changed his position was his
reference to the Goldwater proposal, which authorized awards to plaintiffs as well as
defendants. Senator Allen began his introductory remarks by noting that "this
amendment is not unfamiliar to the Senate. It is similar to the Goldwater amendment.
It is similar to an amendment that the Senate registered 39 votes for in earlier pro-
ceedings (referring to his own earlier amendment, defeated by a 47-39 voter' 122
Cows. REC. 517049 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). These references to earlier amendments,
however, do not indicate that Senator Allen changed his position on attorney's fees.
He referred to the prior amendments merely to refresh the Senate's memory of the
general issue of attorney's fees in tax disputes.
122 Cosa:. REC. S 7050 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (emphasis added).
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A court would he authorized in awarding attorney's fees to a tax-
payer who is a defendant in a civil action brought. by the U.S. Gov-
ernment to enforce the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code....
Since the amendment is intended to apply solely to prevailing defend-
ants in tax cases, the courts would he guided by well-settled judicial
standards in the exercise of their discretionary authority to make fee
awards to defendants."
In the House of Representatives, Representative Drinan, sponsor of the
House version of the bill, introduced Senator Allen's amendment. by saying:
"The Allen amendment would allow the prevailing party to recover its counsel
fees in any civil action brought by the United States to enforce the Internal
Revenue Code. It would not apply to actions instituted against. the govern-
ment by the taxpayer.'' These statements all show it clear understanding
that the bill applies only to defendant-taxpayers.
The sole hope for plaintiff-taxpayers seeking attorney's fees is the phrase
applying the Act. to "any civil action or proceeding. - Senator Allen " and
others have argued that. Congress used the word "proceeding" to indicate
that the statute applies when the IRS initiates administrative processes against
the taxpayer, regardless of which party brings the dispute to court. In a
statement. made over three months after passage of the bill, Senator Allen
provided this tardy explanation of why he used the word "proceeding":
I inserted the word "proceeding" in my new amendment specifically
to include administrative proceedings or audits so that. fees and costs
in connection with audits or other IRS agency proceedings could be
awarded by a court on application by a prevailing taxpayer. I also
included the term "proceeding" so that it would be clear that in any
case involving a disputed tax, the court would be free to award at-
torney's fees ... notwithstanding the formalistic characterization of
the taxpayer as plaintiff or defendant. •
Although courts often quote Senator Allen's statement, they view his remarks
as merely an expression of the Senator's opinion since he made them follow-
ing passage of the bill."
4 " Id. at S17050 (emphasis added).
''' 122 CoN'c,:, Rex;. E112159 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976).
123 CoNG. Rrc. 5731 (daily cd. Jan. H. 1977).
4i, 	note 6 supra.
123 Co;,N( Rex:. 5732 (daily ed. Jan. 14. 1977).
'' See, e.g., Key Buick v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178, l83 (1977). See also
Patzkowski v. United States, 576 F.2r1 134, 136 n.2 (8th Or. 1978), where the court
stated:
While we appreciate the candor of Senator Allen's acknowledgement that
the Government can cause considerable discomfort to a taxpayer without
making hint a defendant in a lawsuit, we consider it significant that this
commentary was made after the passage of the Act. Subsequent continents
placed in the Congressional Record after a bill has been acted upon are of
little value in establishing Congressional intent. Moreover. during the de-
bate which occurred prior to the passage of the Act. it was uniformly
specified and/or implied that awards of attorney's fees would he available
only to tapayer-defentlants.
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There is, however, case law distinguishing the words "action" and "pro-
ceeding", as used in other statutes, and defining 'the word "proceeding" to
include certain IRS administrative activities. 52 For instance, there are cases
holding that activities such as issuance of a deficiency notice," or negotiations
over tax liability, 54 are "proceedings" initiated by the IRS within the meaning
of these statutes. More importantly, some of these cases hold that a Tax Court
suit. instituted by the taxpayer after the issuance of an I RS deficiency notice is
part of such "proceeding." ss Whether these cases are relevant to the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act is, however, questionable. In accordance
with the primary rule of statutory interpretation, whereby courts give stat-
utory language "such construction as will carry into execution the will of Con-
gress,'" courts are not obliged to give the word "proceeding" the same mean-
ing in every statute in which it is found. The wide variance in scope and
meaning ascribed to the word "proceeding" in the context of other statutes ''
indicates that courts do not base their interpretation on any plain-meaning or
straightforward definition of the word; rather, they view the term in the con-
text of each particular statute, and derive its meaning from the policies of
each statute as found in the legislative history. 58 Thus, cases interpreting the
52 See, e.g., Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 352
(1927); American Standard Watch Co. v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 672. 675 (2d Cir.
1956); United States v. P.F. Collier & Son Corp., 208 F.2c1 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1953);
Bahen & Wright, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2(1 538, 539 (4th Cir. 1949); Wheeler's
Peachtree Pharmacy, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. 177, 181 (1960); Ann C. Field v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 187, 206.07 (1959), aff'd, 286 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 949 (1961). Most of these cases deal with state statutes granting cor-
porations a fictional existence following dissolution, so that the corporation can con-
clude "actions. ' or "proceedings" that were initiated by or against it during its statutory
lifetime. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. tit. 8, § 278.
" Bahen & Wright v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 538, 539 (4th Cir. 1949).
" Ann C. Field v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 187. 206-07 (1959). aff'd, 286 F.2d
960 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 949 (1961).
" Bahen & Wright v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 538, 539 (4th Cir. 1949) (defi-
ciency nonce and subsequent Tax Court petition are "parts of an integrated adminis-
trative proceeding"); see also American Standard Watch Co. v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d
672, 675 (2d Cir. 1956). However, to the extent that these decisions are based on the
assumption that the Tax Court is an administrative agency, these decisions are now
irrelevant. The Tax Court, prior to 1969, was an administrative agency of the execu-
tive branch of government. See	 Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 7441, 68A Stat. 879
(now I.R.C.	 7441). In 1960, however, the Tax Court became an official "court"
under article I, section 8 of the Constitution via the Tax RefOrni Act of 1069. Pub. L.
91-172, 83 Stat. 730 (now I.R.C. § 7441). Hence, an assessment and hearing in the Tax
Court is no longer an "integrated administrative proceeding," but a court action result-
ing from an administrative proceeding.
5" kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (citing Brown v. Duchesne,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1857) ).
" The flexible meaning of "proceeding" is indicated in other cases which hold
that. "proceeding" includes such activities as criminal prosecution. United States v. P.F.
Collier & Son Corp., 208 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1953). or IRS tax collection by dis-
traint. Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 352 (1927).
5H The court in Bahen & Wright v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 538 (4th Cir.
1949), fin• example, in interpreting "proceeding" in a Delaware owporate-dissolution
statute, noted that "lsbatutes of this type arc broadly remedial and should be liberally
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word "proceeding" in the context. of other statutes can be distinguished from
cases interpreting "proceeding" in the context. of the Awards Act.•
An examination of the policies and congressional intent behind the Allen
amendment reveals that the word "proceeding" does not warrant a broad def-
inition which would include IRS administrative activities. Every congressman
discussing the bill referred only to court actions."" No one mentioned IRS
harassment through administrative activity. Congress was aware of IRS ad-
ministrative practices and the potential for harassment via these procedures
since Senator Goldwater's proposal specifically referred to harassment
through administrative action."' For this reason, the legislative statements re-
ferring solely to court action reflect a deliberate attempt to limit application of
the amendment; there was no congressional oversight of the possibility of
abusive administrative conduct. The legislative intent, as derived from such
statements, clearly limits the Act to protecting taxpayers against harassing or
vexatious lawsuits. Although this interpretation gives the words "action" and
"proceeding" virtually synonymous meanings, rules of statutory construction
do not forbid the use of two general, flexible terms together in a way that
gives them one collective meaning where the congressional purpose requires
that result. 62 Thus, in interpreting the Awards Act so as to effectuate the will
of Congress, courts have properly limited the scope of the bill to lawsuits in-
itiated "by or on behalf of the United States."
construed in order to permit a disstilved corporation to resist any claim made against it
within three years after the claw of dissolution." The court then decided to give "pro-
ceeding" a broader scope than "action" or "suit - "in order to achieve the fundamental
purpose of the statute." Id. at 530.
The court in Key Buick v. Commissioner. 68 T.C. 178 (1977), cited several
of these corporate dissolution cases, and dismissed them quickly, noting that "Whese
cases involve statutes so different from the statute here involved as to he of little assis-
tance." Id. at 182 11.6.
"" See, e.g., statements by Senator Allen found in text at note 43 supra; state-
ments by Senator Kennedy found in text at note 46 supra; and statements by Rep-
resentative Drinan found in text at now: 47 supra.
See text and notes 40-41 supra,
'' Although the United States Supreme Court has frequently stated that courts
should interpret a statute in such a way that every word and phrase is given meaning,
see, e.g., United States v. Menaschc, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); Platt v. Union R.R.
Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878); see also 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION 46.06 (4th ed. 1973). it has not done so where, as in the case of the Awards Act,
it would contravene the legislators' purpose. As stated in United States v. "Lacks. 375
U.S. 59 (1963):
It is, of course, our duty to give effect to all portions of a statute if that is
possible. But this general principle is meant to guide the courts in further-
ing the intern of the legislature, not overriding it. When rigid adherence to
the general rule would require disregard of clear indications to the con-
trary, the rule must yield.
M. at 69.
''" Even if a court defines the word "proceeding- to include IRS administrative
proceedings, it is doubtful that refund suits in either federal district court or the Court
of Claims would I -all within the statute's scope. A refund suit f011ows the payment of
taxes assessed through an IRS deficiency notice, or the accidental overpayment of
taxes by the taxpayer. The notice and subsequent activities leading to assessment and
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Courts have also been correct in concluding that they should award at-
torney's fees under the Act only if' the IRS's claim is frivolous, vexatious, or
harassing. Statements by several congressmen reveal their perception that the
bill awards fees only in such cases." 4 For example, Senator Kennedy stated
that "[b]y authorizing awards of fees to prevailing defendants in cases brought
under the Internal Revenue Code, ... Congress merely intends to protect
citizens from becoming victims of frivolous or otherwise unwarranted law-
suits." 5 Similarly, Representative Drinan noted that, "under settled judicial
standards, prevailing defendants would recover their attorney Fees only if they
could prove that, the United States brought. the action to harass them, or if the
suit is frivolous and vexatious.'"
This standard for recovery, referred to as "settled" by Representative
Drinan, is similar to the standard which has developed for awarding attorney's
fees to prevailing defendants in civil rights actions."' In civil rights cases
where the prevailing defendant seeks attorney's fees, the defendant must.
prove that the plaintiffs suit is "vexatious and frivolous, or [that] the plaintiff
has instituted it solely to harass or embarrass the defendant..." As men-
payment are arguably "proceedings" initiated by the IRS. But, once the taxpayer has
paid the assessment, the IRS is satisfied and has no continuing interest in the issue.
The proceeding has ended, and the refund suit which follows is entirely separate, and
the choice of the taxpayer alone. As stated in Engel v. United States, 448 F. Stapp. 201
(WA). Pa. 1978):
While it is true that the interchange between counsel for the citizen and
the IRS is begun by the 1RS's issuance of a deficiency notice, it is also clear
that the taxpayer who pays a disputed sum ends these proceedings as far
as the administrative process is concerned. That an option to file suit
thereafter is retained by the taxpayer does not change the fito that the
United Stales has been satisfied and can no longer conduct proceedings in
that claim in its behalf.
M. at 202.
4" Senator Allen, in his belated explanation of the amendment, urged use of
criteria other than "bad faith or harassment. - The Senator stated:
The court need not determine that the Government. has harassed the tax-
payer nor need the court determine that the Government has in some way
acted in bad faith. The amendment as adopted mentions neither harass-
ment nor had faith, but fur some reason, commentators have implied that
such conduct would be a necessary precondition to an award of fees to a
prevailing taxpayer. No, Mr. President. a court in exercising its discretion
should focus rather on the relative resources of the parties and on the
perserveranee of the taxpayer - in vindicating this position.
123 CONC. REC. 5731 (daily ed..jan. 14, 1977). However, these continents, aside from
being late, are contrary to all other congressional indications, and hence are given no
weight by the courts.
122 CONG. REC. 517050 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976).
"" 122 Coxc.	 HI2159 (daily ed. Oct, 1976).
" 7 The committee reports on the original Awards Act discussed these stan-
dards at length. H.R. Rcp. No, 1558, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. I (1976); S. REP No. 1011,
94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 5 (1976). reprinter/ in [19761 U.S. Cons: Coso. & Au. NEWS 5908.
"" H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); ,cry atm) Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412. 422 (1978).
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boned in the House and Senate Reports, the reason for requiring a defendant
to prove harassing or vexatious behavior before the court awards attorney's
fees is to prevent the "chilling effect" on plaintiffs who wish to vindicate their
rights." If a lesser standard applied in civil rights cases, the knowledge that
a plaintiff might have to pay a prevailing defendant's attorney's fees might
deter him front instituting suit where the chances for a favorable decision are
uncertain.' Statements in the floor debates concerning the Allen amend-
ment indicate that Congress was wary of fostering a "chilling effect" in tax
cases as well as in civil rights cases.' As a result, it seems clear that Congress
6" Both the House and Senate Reports refer to the "chilling effect" that au-
thorizing fees for defendants in civil rights cases could have on plaintiffs' willingness to
bring such actions. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2c1 Sess. 5 (1076), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5908, 5912; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1976).
This "vexatious and harassing" standard, applicable to defendants in civil
rights cases in order to avoid a "chilling effect" on plaintiff's, should be contrasted with
the standard for awarding lees to prevailing Main/ills- in civil rights actions. Both the
Senate and House Reports on the Awards Act cited Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). a case involving racial discrimination in a place of
public accommodation, which stated that a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily
recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust." hi. at 400. The purpose for using such a light standard for fee awards to
plaintiffs is "to give such persons effective access to the judicial process where their
grievances can be resolved according to lass.," H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess.
1 (1976). As noted in Piggie Park, "Ii]f successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to
bear their own attorney's fees, few aggrieved parties would he in a position to advance
the public interest by invoking the ... powers of the federal courts." 390 U.S. at 402.
See also S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CoNG. it An. NEws 5908, 5910; 122 CoNG. REC. S17051 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976)
(remarks of Senator Tunney); 122 Com:. REC. H12165 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (re-
marks of Representative Seiberling).
It is significant to note that congressmen, in the floor debate relating to the
Awards Act, constantly referred to the need to afford civil rights plaintiffs access to
the courts, while never mentioning the need to afford taxpayer-plaintiffs access to the
courts. Since the purpose of awarding fees to plaintiffs is to afford them greater access
to the courts, the absence of this purpose in discussions relating to the Allen amend-
ment suggests that Congress did not intend the Awards Act to apply to taxpayer-
plaintiffs. Moreover. Senator Kennedy clearly stated that Congress was aware of the
differing policies behind awards to plaintiffs as opposed to defendants, and deliber-
ately restricted the application of Senator Allen's amendment to defendant-taxpayers:
[A] provision authorizing fee awards in tax cases has a fundamentally dif-
ferent purpose front one authorizing awards in lawsuits brought by private
citizens 10 enforce the protections of our civil rights laws. In enacting the
basic civil rights attorney's fees awards bill, Congress clearly intends to
facilitate and to encourage the bringing of actions to enforce the protec-
tions of the civil rights laws. By authorizing awards of fees to prevailing
defendants in cases brought under the Internal Revenue Code, however,
Congress merely intends to protect citizens from becoming victims of
frivolous or otherwise unwarranted lawsuits.
122 C. 	 REC. S17051 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1976).
71  Senator Kennedy stated:
The courts have articulated the policy reasons for utilizing a stricter test in
awarding fees to prevailing defendants than to prevailing plaintiffs, and
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wished to award attorney's fees to prevailing taxpayer-defendants only if they
could meet the same "bad faith or harassing" standard as required of defend-
ants in civil rights cases.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Application of the Awards Act
From the preceding discussion of the legislative history, it is apparent that
courts such as Key Buick and Patzkowski have acted properly in limiting appli-
cation of the Awards Act to defendant.-taxpayers who can show some sort of
IRS wrongdoing or unreasonableness in bringing suit against them. Unfortu-
nately for taxpayers, the practical utility of the Act is thus limited to relatively
few individuals," Due to the procedures available for contesting one's tax lia-
bility, taxpayers must initiate court actions and be characterized as plaintiffs
for purposes of the Awards Act in the vast majority of cases. 73 The limited
these apply equally in tax cases and in actions brought to enforce the civil
rights laws. Awarding fees to prevailing defendants is intended to protect
parties from being harassed by unjustifiable lawsuits. It is not, however,
intended to deter plaintiffs from seeking to enforce the protections af-
forded by our civil rights laws, or in this instance to deter the Government
from instituting legitimate tax cases by threatening it with the prospect of
having to pay the defendant's counsel fees should it lose. Were Congress or
the courts to provide otherwise, it would have a substantial chilling effect
on the bringing of genuinely meritorious actions. I am sure that none of us
would want to inhibit. responsible lawsuits brought by the. United States to
enforce the tax laws of our country.
122 CONG. REC. S17051 (daily ed. Sept. 14. 1976). See also 122 CoNG. REc. H 12162
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Representative Kastenmeier).
72 In 1978, taxpayers filed 13,284 suits against the IRS in Tax Court. They
filed another 1,029 refund suits in federal district. courts and in the United States
Court of' Claims. In contrast, the government filed only 750 suits to collect unpaid
taxes, and 34 suits to collect erroneous refunds. It brought another 6,506 suits to
enforce summonses of taxpayer's records. These numbers indicate that, aside from
IRS enforcement of summonses, over 90% of all actions disputing tax liability are
initiated by taxpayers. The Awards Act thus aids less than 10% of all taxpayer-litigants.
[1978] CommisstoNER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ANN. REP. 56-61.
7 " If a taxpayer wants to contest a deficiency notice. he can refuse to pay the
tax and, within ninety clays, file in the Tax Court a petition challenging the validity of
the notice. I.R.C. § 6213. Alternatively, the taxpayer can pay the amount assessed,
petition the IRS for a refund. I.R.C. § 6601, and, if it is denied, bring a refund suit in
either a federal district court, 28 U.S.C: § 1346 (1976), or the Court of 'Claims, 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). Similarly, if the taxpayer claims that he has overpaid his taxes
and the IRS denies his refund request, he can institute a suit in either federal district.
court or the Cowl of Claims. Note that in each of these instances, the taxpayer is the
plaintiff itt the suit, and hence ineligible to recover attorney's fees under the Awards
Act.
Conversely. the most common situations in which the government sues the tax-
payer are when the Service alleges that it has made an erroneous refund, I.R.C.
§ 7405; when it. seeks to enforce a statutory lien resulting from nonpayment of taxes.
I.R.C. § 741)3; or when it seeks to enfOrce a summons which a taxpayer has ignored,
I.R.C. § 7604. As mentioned earlier, see note 72 supra, these situations are rare in
comparison with the total volume of taxpayer - IRS litigation.
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scope of the Awards Act thus severely restricts the number of instances in
which awards are appropriate.
Only twice have courts found that the government's action was suffi-
ciently unjustified to warrant an award of attorney's fees to a defendant-
taxpayer. In United States v. Garrison," the government sued to enforce a
summons directing the taxpayers to turn over their business records for in-
spection by IRS agents. The taxpayers refused to comply with the summons,
claiming that section 7605(h) of the Internal Revenue Code protects taxpayers
from more than one inspection of books and accounts for a taxable year un-
less the taxpayer requests the inspection or the Secretary notifies the taxpayer
in writing that another inspection is necessary. Since this was to be a second
inspection of the books and the IRS had failed to request a second inspection
in writing, the court refused to enforce the summons. On respondent's re-
quest for attorney's fees, the court held that the IRS's lawsuit constituted an
"unnecessary and vexatious burden upon the taxpayer which required it to
employ counsel to defend this action."" The taxpayers were therefore al-
lowed to recover reasonable attorney's fees from the government.
Attorney's fees also were awarded to a taxpayer-defendant in the case of
In re Sloday. 7" In that case, the taxpayer had assumed control of three corpo-
rations which, at the time of takeover, were delinquent in payment to the
government of employee wage withholdings and FICA taxes. Although the
corporations had insufficient funds to pay these pre-takeover taxes im-
mediately, Slodav desired to keep current on all post-takeover payments of
employee withholdings to avoid incurring personal liability under Code sec-
tions 6672 and 7501." To accomplish this goal, Slodav and the IRS agreed
to apply his payments first to post-takeover obligations for which he was per-
sonally liable (i.e., employee -income tax and FICA withholdings, characterized
as "trust funds" under section 7501), and the remainder to other post-
takeover obligations to, which no personal liability attached (i.e., employer's
share of FICA, referred to as a "non-trust fund" obligation)." There was no
reference in the agreement to the responsibilities, if any, of either Slodav or
the corporate treasuries for pre-takeover taxes. The Service breached its
promise, and simply allocated the payments between the post-takeover non-
trust fund obligations and the post-takeover trust fund obligations. As a re-
sult, SlodaV fell behind in his current trust fund payments. When Slodav's
74 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9705 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
75 Id.
7" 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. II 9215 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
' I.R.C. § 6672(a) imputes personal liability to any person who is entrusted
with the duty of collecting taxes and who willfully fails to collect and pay the amounts
over to the Government. It also imposes a penalty of 100% of the unoillectecl or
unpaid amounts. I.R.C. § 7501 requires a taxpayer to keep any amounts collected
separate from the employer's own funds, and hold the funds in a special "trust" for
the United States. Failure to collect and pay these "trust fund" amounts results in
personal liability under § 6672.
'" The court noted that the IRS Field Collection Manual required the IRS to
honor this agreement. 79-2 U.S. Tax Gas. !I 9215, at 86,407.
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business fortunes foundered, and he filed for bankruptCy, the Service brought
personal claims against him under section 6672 for willful failure to pay his
post-takeover trust fund withholding taxes. In addition, the Service claimed
that Slodav was personally liable for nonpayment of the delinquent pre-
takeover trust fund obligations.
Slodav's liability for post-takeover trust fund payments was resolved in his
favor by the Sixth Circuit 7" after two appeals from decisions in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings" and in district court. 8 ' The government's claim for
pre-takeover liability went to the United States Supreme Court before being
decided in Slodav's favor. 82 After these disputes were resolved, Slodav
brought suit in the district court requesting his attorney's fees under the
Awards Act.
The district court accepted the Patzkowski standard for awarding fees, but
decided that the government's claim for pre-takeover taxes, although novel,
was "not a case where the position of the IRS can be said to he without foun-
dation, meritless, or founded in bad faith." 83 As to the claim for post-
takeover taxes, however, the court found that the IRS had disregarded a valid
agreement to allocate corporate payments in a particular way, and that the
IRS's failure to abide by the agreement led to the claim for post-takeover
liability." Therefore, the claim under section 6672 for these amounts was
"wholly without foundation," and was "an act done in bad faith." 85 The
court went so far as to state that "[w]hat the IRS practiced on Dr. Slodav was
trickery—nothing less."" The court thus awarded attorney's fees to Slodav
in an amount representing his defense of post-takeover liability.
Although the case law development in this area is still in its nascent.
stages, one can envision other circumstances where awards of attorney's fees
would be appropriate. For example, courts may find it proper to award fees
when the IRS takes a position that is plainly contrary to existing legal prece-
dent. This situation is likely to arise when IRS administrative policy differs
from judicial interpretation of the law. Occasionally, the Service may use a
taxpayer as a "guinea pig" to challenge a past court decision. Even worse, it.
may attempt to force the taxpayer to agree to an out-of-court settlement
where the IRS knows that settlement is a more attractive option than a costly
legal battle. Of course, a court still must decide the difficult question of
whether the action was in any way reasonably well-founded: But courts should
consider such actions proper occasions for awarding attorneys fees.
Another situation in which a court. may award attorney's fees to a taxpayer
is where the IRS engages in "fishing expeditions" to ferret out tax liability.
The taxpayer may incur attorney's fees in resisting audits or summonses of
7" In re Slodav v. United States, 552 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1977).
" In re Slodav, 74-2 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶ 9719 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
81 In re Slodav, 75-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9829 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
82 Slodav v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978).
83 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 9215, at 86,409.
H4 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 86,410.
March 1079]	 TAXPAYERS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES	 555
records when the Service cannot show the required reasonableness in suspect-
ing the taxpayer of sonic type of tax sin, or in suspecting that certain re-
quested records are relevant to the Service's inquiry into tax hability. 87 Courts
certainly should consider such suits to compel audits or production of records
as "vexatious or unreasonable.""
B. The Efficacy of the Awards Act
Cases such as Slodav and Garrison graphically demonstrate that Congress
was correct in assuming that taxpayers sometimes suffer greatly as a result of
harassing or frivolous lawsuits instituted by the IRS. Thus, Congress was jus-
tified in authorizing awards of attorney's fees to a taxpayer who is required to
employ counsel to defend against the unreasonable action. The question that
remains is whether it was reasonable for Congress to distinguish between
plaintiff and defendant taxpayers. To the extent that. Congress was concerned
with protecting taxpayers against harassing, unreasonable, or bad faith con-
duct. by the IRS—and all indications are that this was exactly their
concern "—the answer must be no.
All taxpayers who are subjected to abuses of power by the IRS, whether
plaintiff or defendant, are deserving of attorney's fees. The taxpayer suffers
87 Section 7602 of the internal Revenue Code states:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person
for ally internal revenue tax ... or collecting such liability, the Secretary is
authorized–
(1) to examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may ,
be relevant ()r material to such inquiry;
(2) to summon the person liable for tax ... or any other person the
Secretary may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary ... and to
produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such
testimony, under oath. as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
Section 7602 thus defines the proper purposes for which a suninunis may issue, and
also limits the scope of a summons to those persons, books, or records which may be
"relevant or mat erial" to carrying out those purposes. The test of materiality and rele-
vance has been defined as whether the books or persons sought "might throw light on
the correctness of the taxpayer's return." United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274
(8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Worn, 420 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1969), earl. denied,
397 U.S. 1074 (1970).
Thus, where the Service issues a summons for an improper purpose, see United
States v. LaSalle, 437 U.S. 298, 318 (1978) (discussing the impropriety of a summons
issued to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution), or seeks hooks that are not "rel-
evant or material" to an inquiry within a proper purpose, a court may find the suit
"harassing or vexatious ," and award attorney's fees.
88 This was the situation confronting the court in United States v. Goldman.
453 F. Supp. 508 (C.D. Cal. 1978). Although the court found that certain records
sought by the IRS did not contain information that "might throw light on the correct-
ness of bite taxpayer's] income tax liabilities," it denied attorney's fees because "the
summons was issued in good faith and for a proper purpose. - Id. at 512.
See text at notes (15-66 supra (remarks of Senator Kennedy and Representa-
tive Drinan); see also the remarks of Senators Helms, Tunney, and Kennedy, all men-
tioning harassment by the !RS as the mischief at which the bill is aimed. 122 Co c.
REC. 517050 (daily ed. Sept. 29. 1076).
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equally in terms of time, cost, mental aggravation, and tying up of assets in-
volved whether he pays the disputed tax and brings a refund suit, or refuses
to pay the tax and is subjected to a government collection suit against him.
Yet the Awards Act distinguishes between taxpayer-defendants and
taxpayer-plaintiffs. The anomolous result is that the statute penalizes tax-
payers who pay IRS assessments and seek after-the-fact judicial review by de-
nying them attorney's fees, while it rewards those who ignore IRS assessments
and are brought into court by the IRS. The reason for this unjust result is
unclear. Perhaps, as Senator Allen suggested, Congress was concerned about
"stirring up litigation" if it were to authorize attorney's fee awards for plain-
tiffs." However, even if this concern is a rational one, a better course would
have been for Congress to allow plaintiffs to recover their fees, but only
where they could meet the same "had faith or harassing" standard used for
taxpayer-defendants. Instead of adopting the more lenient standard used for
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, where they
would "ordinarily recover their fees,"" Congress could have imposed the
tougher "bad faith or harassing" standard. In this way, Congress could have
avoided "stirring up" litigation, while at the same time allowing taxpayers to
protect themselves against wrongful IRS activity.
Indeed, there is good reason for rejecting the standard governing recov-
ery by plaintiffs in civil rights cases, aside from the fear of proliferation of
litigation. Suits instituted by plaintiffs under the civil rights laws have the ben-
eficial effect of furthering public policy, in addition to allowing private recov-
ery.92 Civil rights plaintiffs act, in essence, as "private attorneys general." •' 3
By comparison, awarding fees to prevailing taxpayer-plaintiffs would not
promote any public policy; taxpayers act only for themselves and their pock-
etbooks in contesting IRS claims, and cannot, in any sense, be characterized
as "private attorneys general." Thus, there is no basis for applying the more
lenient standard developed for prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to prevailing
•taxpayer-plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, since taxpayer-plaintiffs are subject to the same costs, mental
aggravation, time, and tying-up of assets as taxpayer-defendants, a bill to pro-
vide attorney's fees for any prevailing taxpayer, regardless of his ultimate
status in court, is warranted. Since the injuries are the same, the standards for
recovery should also be the same. Therefore, Congress could have better
achieved its purpose if it had drafted the Awards Act to allow any taxpayer
who is subject to a frivolous, unfounded, or harassing entanglement with the
IRS that ultimately results in legal action to recover his attorney's fees.
" See note 39 supra. Although the Senator's statements refer to the civil rights
portion of the Awards Act, it is reasonable to assume that his concern carried over into
the area of tax litigation.
" t See note 70 supra, for discussion of the standard for awarding fees to pre-
vailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, and the policy reasons behind that standard.
"2 Id. Sec also note 2 supra.
"a See note 70 supra,
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New proposals have been made in both houses of Congress which would
achieve this result by extending eligibility for attorney's fees to any prevailing
taxpayer. One such bill, introduced by Senator Allen, provides:
In any civil action wherein the United States or the Internal Revenue
Service is a party and in which tax liability to the United States on
the part of any person is asserted, the court may in its discretion
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party other than
the United States or the Internal Revenue Service."'
Until Congress passes a bill such as this, taxpayers must continue to consider
the costs of litigation when deciding whether to contest IRS claims against
them. Although the Awards Act was a step in the right direction, it is, in
reality, only hall a step. Congress should move to provide the full protection
for all taxpayers that is needed to prevent the IRS from engaging in activities
which are plainly unjustified, but which may go unrernedied unless taxpayers
can recoup the costs of seeking justice.
CONCLUSION
Courts have narrowly construed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, as applied to tax litigation, so as to benefit only a few taxpayers.
Although Congress deliberately restricted the availability of attorney's fees to
prevailing taxpayer-defendants, this restriction is unfair and, indeed, irra-
tional. Congress' desire to award attorney's fees to individuals who suffer
from abusive IRS -behavior should extend to both plaintiff- and defendant-
taxpayers. Furthermore, the standards for awarding fees should be the same
in both instances. Allowing taxpayers to recover whenever they can show
harassing, vexatious, or frivolous action by the IRS would sufficiently protect
them from the harm with which Congress was most concerned, and, at the
same time, would avoid stirring up litigation or chilling the Service's willing-
ness to collect taxes. A move to expand the coverage of the Awards Act to all
laxpAyers is warranted.
JEFFREY R. MARTIN
14 S. 1610 was sponsored by Senators Allen and Cranston; it has been referred
to the Judiciary Committee and is presently awaiting consideration. 123 Cure. REC.
58764 (daily cd. May 26, 1977); see also. H.R. 6903, H.R. 8260, and H.R. 8312, intro-
duced on May 4, 1977, July 13, 1977, and July 14, 1977, respectively. 123 CONG. REC.
H4061, 1-17070, and H 7 1 7 0.
